The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Developing Networks for Sustainable Agriculture by Curry, Nigel R & Kirwan, James R
This is a peer-reviewed, post-print (final draft post-refereeing) version of the following published document 
and is licensed under Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 license:
Curry, Nigel R and Kirwan, James R (2014) The Role of Tacit Knowledge in 
Developing Networks for Sustainable Agriculture. Sociologia Ruralis, 54 
(3). pp. 341-361. ISSN 0038-0199 
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/soru.12048
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/soru.12048
EPrint URI: http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/1192
Disclaimer 
The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material 
deposited and as to their right to deposit such material.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness 
for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any 
patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.  
The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any 
material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an 
allegation of any such infringement. 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT.
  
This is a peer-reviewed, post-print (final draft post-refereeing) version of the following 
published document: 
 
Curry, Nigel and Kirwan, James R (2014) The Role of 
Tacit Knowledge in Developing Networks for 
Sustainable Agriculture. Sociologia Ruralis, 54 (3), 
341-361.  
 
Published in Sociologia Ruralis, and available online at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12048/abstract;jsessionid=2D0BB830
04A30CF302221968A96898D7.f01t02 
 
We recommend you cite the published (post-print) version. 
The URL for the published version is http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/soru.12048 
  
Disclaimer 
The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title 
in the material deposited and as to their right to deposit such material. 
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial 
utility, title, or fitness for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in 
respect of any material deposited. 
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will 
not infringe any patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights. 
The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual 
property rights in any material deposited but will remove such material from public view 
pending investigation in the event of an allegation of any such infringement. 
 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT. 
 
1 
 
The role of tacit knowledge in developing networks for sustainable agriculture 
 
Abstract  
 
Whilst objectivist epistemologies have been dominant in productivist agriculture, the 
local, cultural and environmental contexts of sustainable agriculture are more fully 
informed by constructivist epistemologies. Within constructivism, tacit knowledge – an 
intuitive knowledge that cannot be formalised – is explored empirically. Six types of tacit 
knowledge were identified as a result of working closely with a sustainable food network: 
the Brighton and Hove Food Partnership. Customs cohere around integrating food with 
other sustainable activity; developing a complex unregulated organisation requires 
savoire faire. The unique character of Brighton has developed an operational folklore, 
and network identity is important, particularly in relation to conventional agriculture and 
to the city as a whole. A confidence in people’s roles has helped define network 
development and using different discourses, communicating the network in diverse 
contexts, is important for understanding the network. All these tacit knowledge elements 
have a strong influence over the network but have to be assimilated rather than learned. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Much has been written from a social-scientific perspective about the content of the 
knowledge required for the development of sustainable agriculture (Hendrix et al, 1992, 
Lichtfouse et al, 2009, Hanayani and Prawito, 2011) and about the appropriate systems 
of learning required for knowledge transfer in such development (Pretty, 1994, Röling 
and Wagemakers, 1998Rather less attention has been paid to the different forms of 
knowledge that have significance for the development of sustainable agriculture. Morgan 
and Murdoch (2000) note that the dominance of objectivist knowledge in ‘conventional’ 
agriculture tends to replace ‘local’ knowledge with ‘expert’ knowledge and underplays 
social, economic and cultural values. It is argued in this paper that approaching 
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sustainable agriculture through a constructivist knowledge lens allows a range of these 
values within ‘sustainable’ agriculture to be more clearly identified thus improving an 
understanding of the distinctive nature of sustainable agriculture. Within this 
constructivist knowledge domain, the paper examines the nature of tacit knowledge 
because it is claimed to offer the potential to embrace both values (Merton, 1973) and 
belief systems (Polanyi (1946) explicitly, and is considered to provide a component of 
‘local’ knowledge (Morgan and Murdoch, 2000). Certainly these claims for tacit 
knowledge merit its examination to see if it can help make sense of some of the claimed 
precepts of sustainable agriculture. This examination is developed empirically through an 
English case study.  
 
In doing this, the paper is structured in the following way. Firstly, a characterisation of 
sustainable agriculture is offered as a context for forms of knowledge likely to be 
important in its development. Some salient strands of objectivist and constructivist 
epistemologies are then reviewed. Here, it is argued that the precepts of the objectivist 
epistemology have been dominant in productivist agriculture, as ‘science’ has sought to 
increase food outputs for a hungry world. But for sustainable agriculture, constructivist 
epistemologies, particularly in relation to local, social, cultural and environmental 
contexts, have an important role.  
 
One manifestation of constructivist epistemology is argued to be tacit knowledge, and 
this is developed for empirical study. Using the notions of tacit knowledge asserted 
particularly by Polanyi (1966) and developed by Gerholm (1990), six forms are 
postulated: customs; savoir faire, folklore, identity, roles and discourse. These are 
evaluated in the context of negotiating sustainable agriculture values in the development 
of a sustainable food strategy. Conclusions are then drawn about the relative importance 
of different forms of knowledge in the development of sustainable agriculture in practice, 
identified in the research. 
 
3 
 
The case study used is from a European Framework VII programme, designed to identify 
barriers and catalysts to the development of learning and innovation networks for 
sustainable agriculture.1 Seventeen case studies of sustainable agriculture networks 
were chosen across eight European countries. They were chosen because they operated 
largely outside mainstream knowledge provision in agriculture and had identifiable 
‘grassroots’ origins. They were termed LINSAs – Learning and Innovation Networks for 
Sustainable Agriculture. The case study reported here is that of the development of the 
Brighton and Hove Food Strategy (Brighton and Hove Food Partnership (BHFP), 2012) 
which involved the identification and interplay of a large number of stakeholders in 
various networks concerned with all elements of sustainable food production and 
consumption in the City.  
 
A participatory methodology has been deployed, which advocates the involvement of 
research stakeholders in the majority, if not the entirety, of the research process (Allen-
Collinson et al, 2005). Thus, specific research methods for collecting data were co-
designed by the research team and the BHFP in partnership and were played out over a 
period of two years. Commonly termed research ‘co-production’, such an approach 
provides experiential expertise that outside ‘experts’ on their own might not perceive 
(Collins and Evans, 2007). As an ‘interpretivist’ approach (Evans et al, 2000) it commits 
the researchers to understanding the social world from the perspective of those social 
actors who inhabit it. It also allows participant-stakeholders’ preferences and needs to 
inform the research process, leading to what Ostrom (1996) considers are potentially 
better and more achievable outcomes.  
 
Within this frame, research methods embraced interactive learning (a two-way 
discursive flow of information) which included world cafes, workshops, focus groups and 
                                          
1 The project, entitled Support for Learning and Innovation Networks in Sustainable Agriculture (SOLINSA) was 
funded by the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Commission and ran between February 2011 
and January 2014. 
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knowledge exchange for a, all of which took place in Brighton and Hove. Three members 
of the research team took an active part in these activities and cumulatively they 
involved over 100 people involved with Brighton and Hove Food Partnership activities. All 
of these forms were active, participatory and involved mutual learning: flows of 
information and ideas passed from the LINSA to the research team and vice versa, with 
the intention of benefiting both. In addition, as preparation for this interactive mutual 
learning approach, the research team undertook a series of  15 face to face and 12 
telephone interviews and a desk study to become informed about the nature and content 
of the strategy development. All of these methods collectively provided the information 
reported in this paper.  Following our inductive approach, thematic analysis was carried 
out on the data. 
 
The purpose of the methodological approach is to encourage participant-stakeholders to 
engage fully in the research. There are nuances in this approach: insider vs. outsider 
relations (Garfinkel, 2002); degrees of ‘insider-ness’ (Allen-Collinson, 2011) differences 
in cultural values (Fetterman, 1989) and the ethics surrounding this kind of involvement 
(Sieber, 1992). But as Wadsworth (1998) suggests, participatory method can be seen as 
an expression of “new paradigm science” that differs significantly from old paradigm or 
positivist science. This is a useful characteristic for the exploration of constructivist 
knowledge, considered below. The approach potentially empowers the participant-
stakeholders and can provide a voice for ‘ordinary’ people (Freire, 1972). Data are 
collected entirely within their context and observations about this context are part of the 
data (Allen-Collinson et al, 2005). Participatory methodology then can lead to action for 
change within a local context (Minkler and Wallerstein, 2003) 
 
Within this study, however, some limitations to this approach were experienced. Some 
participant-stakeholders were reluctant to become involved because the researchers 
were ‘outsiders; and the workings of the Food Partnership were not really to do with the 
latter. Some felt that the ‘monitoring’ culture was not really part of the ethos of the 
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movement and measures such as ‘efficiency’ were not within the Partnership lexicon. 
Certainly, not all participant-stakeholders were equally committed to a participatory 
method and therefore some voices were’ louder’ than others in the progress of the 
research. But as Kavannagh et al, (2002) note, it is an inherently ‘messy’ research 
approach (and even one that is unattractive to academic journals because of this) that 
nevertheless is an important one because of the distinctive results it can provide.  
 
In the literature used in the development of the argument of this paper, the term 
knowledge is used both differently and imprecisely. Lejeune’s (2011) constructions are 
used here as a benchmark for the meaning of knowledge, although it is recognised that 
other writers may well be using it (legitimately) in different ways and yet others use it in 
ways which are sometimes difficult to deduce with certainty. Lejeune (2011) draws a 
distinction between data (observations or measurements which he claims at least 
consciously, are devoid of intention – and therefore considered objective), information 
(the organisation of data to provide meaning) and knowledge: information that has been 
assimilated and interpreted on different occasions by a person or people. Information 
has to be understood and interpreted to become knowledge (Lee and Yang, 2000). 
Whilst open to debate, using this convention allows objectivist and constructivist 
knowledges (as opposed to data and information) to be distinguished. 
 
2. The knowledge context for sustainable agriculture  
 
Sustainable agriculture cannot be defined (Pretty, 1994). This is because, Pretty claims, 
it is not an objectivist construct subject to independent verification by immutable laws. 
Despite this, writers and policy makers have attempted to identify some of its 
parameters. There is some consensus that it embraces non-market, social, cultural and 
environmental goals, as well as market ones. Thus, it should indefinitely meet food 
needs within acceptable social, economic and environmental costs (Crossen, 1992) and 
be resilient to environmental and economic change (Conway and Barbier, 1990). The 
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United Kingdom Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (2002) 
considers that it should be socially acceptable whilst minimising environmental and 
financial risks and the English Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Environmental Challenges in Farm Management, 2012) further add food security, the 
protection of landscape, wildlife, cultural and archaeological values, and animal welfare, 
into the mix. 
 
This combination of values and principles makes learning systems for sustainable 
agriculture complex. They are required to embrace the multiple perspectives of a variety 
of stakeholders and they must continually adjust over time to changing conditions and 
insights. Pretty (1994) asserts that such systems of learning need to be participatory to 
be effective because they must embrace the values of all. To the extent that knowledge 
of, and for, these values goes beyond objective knowledge, they are commonly 
developed through trust as much as through verification (Palmer et al, 2009). In 
essence, sustainable agriculture is driven as much by values as by the ‘scientific’ 
knowledge of food production, an issue explored by Ingram (2008) in the context of soil 
management.  
 
The established Agricultural Knowledge and Information System (AKIS) in England, as in 
most other ‘western’ nations, is not particularly well suited to these kinds of knowledge 
requirement. From the late 1980s, it shifted from a state-based system to a market-
based one where commercial research into ‘scientific’ knowledge displaced trust-based 
processes, and learning networks between farmers and state advisers were lost (Hall and 
Pretty, 2008). Just as the non-market knowledge needs for a ‘values-based’ sustainable 
agriculture were becoming more evident, the market-based AKIS was becoming less well 
suited to providing them. Whilst advice about the non-market components of agriculture 
has had a role in the sector, it has developed largely in the context of securing grant aid 
and for regulatory compliance (Garforth et al 2003; House of Commons Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2011), both of which are commercial considerations. 
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Because of this, knowledge about the values of sustainable agriculture are commonly 
offered outside of the conventional AKIS altogether (McNie, 2007). Knowledge and 
information systems for sustainable agriculture that embrace beliefs and actions beyond 
conventional agriculture are not only different in the content of knowledge (see below), 
but in the means of knowledge transfer. This more commonly take place through co-
learning, networks, mutual support and more informal mechanisms than through ‘expert’ 
advice (Curry et al, 2012). They have been termed Learning and Innovation Networks 
for Sustainable Agriculture (LINSA) of which the case study in this paper is an example. 
 
3. Forms of agricultural knowledge  
 
The limitations of conventional AKISs to provide an adequate knowledge base for 
sustainable agriculture are connected with the relationship between market and non-
market knowledge, but also with the form of knowledge that is most appropriate. It is 
argued in this section that the form of agricultural knowledge offered by the AKIS is 
largely objectivist but the forms of knowledge deployed for sustainable agriculture are 
largely constructivist, the domain into which tacit knowledge falls. Salient differences 
between these two forms are developed in this section through a review of the 
constructivist critique of objectivist knowledge.  
Objectivism 
 
Objectivist (sometimes termed ‘positivist’ in the literature) knowledge approaches in 
agriculture aspire to eliminate all social influences over knowledge creation and in so 
doing determine the ‘true’ nature of the world outside of the individual mind (Wilson, 
1998, Louth, 1990). Cleveland (2001) notes that plant breeding has exemplified the 
development of this objectivist ‘scientific knowledge’ in agriculture, firmly grounded in 
Darwinian constructs of species selectivity. It has been remarkably successful in 
increasing technical productivity and food production (Evans 1998). Cleveland (2001) 
considers most plant breeders undertake their work consistent with this approach, as 
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“applied evolutionists” (page 253) although their development of science is largely 
empirical rather than theoretical. Here, social context is used as a justification for 
science (in order to feed a growing population2) rather than an influence over it (Wallace 
and Yan, 1998). Objectivist knowledge is argued to be socially neutral and responds to 
market signals such as profitability or gross margins (Cleveland, 2001), avoiding any 
consideration of values outside of the market.  
 
Empiricism is seen by many as the entry point of objectivist knowledge (Baird and 
Kaufmann, 2008). It is founded on evidence and experimentation: hypotheses and 
theories are tested against observation rather than reasoning, tradition or beliefs. 
Observations, according to Spedding (2009) then accumulate over time sufficient for the 
hypothesis to be generally accepted as a ‘theory’. Theories are then seen as ‘best 
explanations’ and hold until better explanations come along, creating new theories. This 
is ‘science’ pushing back the boundaries of knowledge. Objectivist knowledge, then, has 
at least the goal of eliminating errors or biases due to perspective, history or culture and 
establishing ‘facts’ independent of the observer. This requires accurate scientific 
measurement that can be reproduced, and the avoidance of personal bias (Daston and 
Galison, 2007).  
 
Such an epistemology has done much to achieve productive objectives and increase farm 
incomes. It has led to more uniform (or universal) plant and animal varieties adapted to 
geographically wide, relatively optimal growing environments with high yield and yield 
stability (Cleveland, 2001, Fisher, 1996). But whilst such ‘scientific’ achievements were 
significant in their time, the changing imperatives of sustainable agriculture suggest a 
need to maintain valuable agricultural outputs but with both fewer inputs and on more 
marginal areas of land (Mann, 1999). 
                                          
2 This social context, however, assumes the ‘problem’ is absolute food shortage rather than the unequal 
distribution of food. 
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Constructivist critiques of objectivism 
 
These objectivist approaches have been criticised through constructivist epistemologies, 
which claim that scientific knowledge is, in fact, dominated by social forces, power 
relationships and cultural contexts (Foucault, 1994, Bourdieu, 2000). At an interpersonal 
level, far from being value neutral, objectivist knowledge is simply validated as being 
true by mutual endorsement rather than any objective truth (Polanyi, 1951). ‘Scientific’ 
knowledge therefore grows largely from co-operation and is beyond the gift of any one 
person to develop as it requires consensus. Because of this, empirical method, Polanyi 
(1958) suggests, is not able to provide the ‘truth’ in any mechanical way. For all of us, 
scientists included, our beliefs go beyond what we can prove. 
 
In this societal and personal context, the objectivist epistemology is dominated by the 
social control of technology and information, for example, through industrial 
modernisation and agricultural intensification. Objective knowledge becomes ‘expert’ 
knowledge that the expert ‘scientist’ deems too difficult for the ‘lay’ public to use 
meaningfully (Rosenbaum, 1978, Bok, 2001). 
 
Constructivists claim that objectivists ignore the social and cultural context of putative 
‘objective’ knowledge (for example, of plant breeding) at their peril: a universal 
‘objective’ science ignores local contexts, conditions and cultures, that local farmers are 
much better placed to understand (Scott, 1998). Whist developing hybrid plants that 
yield increased outputs per acre is considered good objectivist science, it may well be 
more to do with the culture of capitalism seeking to maximise profit (Kloppenberg, 
1988). It is difficult, for example, to ignore the political and cultural contexts of the 
‘objectivist’ sciences of cloning and genetically modified crops.  
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Whilst constructivists emphasise this social and cultural context in the production of 
knowledge, there are similar contexts in its consumption. ‘Scientific’ knowledge needs to 
be believed and trusted before it becomes adopted. This has a number of components. 
The knowledge needs to be believed but also those who produce it need to hold the 
confidence of the user. Palmer et al (2009) for example, report people’s lack of trust in 
scientific institutions having a strong influence on the uptake of strategies for the control 
of animal disease. Maye et al’s (2012) analysis of grower decision making strategies for 
plant diseases also notes the influence of trust. In this case a good deal of trust is placed 
with professional advisors and agronomists but scientific risk assessments are often 
modified by local conditions. 
 
Such objectivist knowledge also needs to have an acceptable political context. Grant 
(2009) reports contentions between scientists and government in relation to the 
reduction in the incidence of bovine TB. And of course, decisions are constantly being 
made in social contexts as to whether the outcomes of objective knowledge are desirable 
outcomes for the individual decision-maker anyway. 
 
A further criticism of objectivism is that it oversimplifies the real world to create rules 
and operational techniques. It tends to isolate knowledge into ‘silos’ in order to examine 
it. As Spedding (2009, page 2) has suggested “it is always best if only one independent 
variable can be changed at a time”. This approach has been termed by Simon (1991) 
‘bounded rationality’ which, through simplification, can lead to imperfect knowledge, 
uncertainty and an increased risk of making wrong decisions.  
 
Dryzek (1987) suggests reasons for this reductionism. Firstly, objectivist knowledge 
tends to break down complex problems into a set of more simple ones so that they can 
be examined more closely. But if the complexity is maintained and the social context of 
the problem is embraced, it becomes possible to examine the linkages between the 
disaggregated problems as well as the problems themselves. Constructivist knowledge is 
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better at addressing the linkages. Hass (2004) emphasises this in the context of 
sustainable development generally because, he claims, it takes place through interacting 
elements and intersections of complex problems. Scientific knowledge is not well suited 
to informing these intersections because they require: 
 
“a simultaneous assault on pollution, economic development, the unequal distribution of 
economic resources, and poverty reduction” (page 570). 
 
Secondly, objectivist knowledge tends to be reduced in order to allow a single value 
system to be applied to the issue. Constructivist epistemologies can accommodate more 
than one value system at a time. Similarly, constructivist epistemologies can 
accommodate different viewpoints and can even be used in situations where there are no 
articulated viewpoints (Ostrom 1990). This kind of negotiated knowledge also has 
advantages where the nature of the ‘problem’ is unclear (Fisher, 1993). In these 
contexts, to reduce what Polanyi (1958) terms ‘higher level realities’ to lower level 
‘truths’ is what he terms ‘moral inversion’. 
 
Kuhn (1962) also claims that there can be no objective scientific truth at any one point 
in time. Scientific ‘beliefs’ rely upon a consensus of the scientific community. Spedding 
(2009) suggests that with new discovery there is a period when research findings that do 
not support existing theory are seen as being the fault of the researcher. Only after 
there is sufficient evidence that does not support the theory, will the original theory be 
abandoned in favour of another one. This new consensus, Kuhn (1962) states, then 
changes the nature of ‘objective’ science sometimes fundamentally, through paradigm 
shifts, which often provide competing accounts of scientific knowledge.  
 
This can leave objectivist knowledge indeterminate. Spedding (2009) exemplifies this 
with climate change knowledge. Climate change is such a complex ‘problem’ that it 
cannot be simplified: there are a number of competing simultaneous paradigms that 
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derive from ‘objective’ evidence. As a result it is not sound, for example, to claim that 
global warming arises as a result of burning fossil fuels, or indeed that it does not 
(Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). These are not ‘observations’ but hypotheses, unprovable 
because there are too many variables at work. In any event, as Polyanin (2002) notes, 
boundary conditions mean that one set of evidence can ‘objectively’ lead to a number of 
different solutions: there is no necessary unique interpretation of one set of ‘facts’.  
 
Objectivist epistemologies thus may well tend to oversimplify the real world, be 
conservative because of the reputational risk of being wrong (Polanyi, 1958) and have a 
propensity to be indeterminate. Hass (2004) also suggests that they have a limited 
influence over policy because they may be neither wisdom nor true, they may have 
significant and negative equity consequences and:  
 
“politicians don’t want science, they want justification for political intentions” (page 572). 
 
In this context, Hass (2004) defines useable knowledge as accurate information that is 
also useable for policymakers and politicians: it should be at the same time, credible, 
legitimate and timely. 
 
4. Objectivism and constructivism in knowledge for sustainable agriculture  
 
Morgan and Murdoch (2000) set these differing epistemologies into an agricultural 
context, arguing that conventional agriculture (in Europe at least) has been driven by 
objectivist approaches, using codified knowledge that is standardised, explicit and easily 
transferable. It builds upon previous science and is therefore both cumulative and path 
dependent. They assert that it has been actively introduced into conventional agriculture 
by upstream input industrialists (fertilizer manufacturers for example) and downstream 
food retailers as a means of wresting power over the whole food chain. 
 
13 
 
This increase in ‘codified’ knowledge has redistributed knowledge away from the farm, 
but it also represents a shift away from more constructivist approaches that pertained in 
agriculture historically. The dominance of ‘local’ farming knowledge gave way in a post 
war Europe to a ‘scientific’ knowledge to arrest food shortages and make agriculture 
more ‘efficient’. State support ensured effective knowledge transfer, but in this, farmer 
knowledge was replaced by external ‘specialist adviser’ knowledge. Morgan and Murdoch 
(2000) suggest that with farmer knowledge of local farm fertilities, for example, being 
displaced by the ubiquity of standard and universal pesticides and fertilisers, whilst the 
ownership of the farm did not change, the ownership of the production of food, did.  
 
In the context of sustainable agriculture, there are arguments that favour a reassertion 
of more constructivist forms of knowledge (Alder, 2002). Cleveland (2001) acknowledges 
the importance of the social and economic context of knowledge specifically for 
sustainable agriculture:  
 
“Our ability to develop more sustainable agriculture will depend to an important degree 
on a clearer understanding of the joint contribution of biophysical and social reality to 
scientific knowledge, and of the epistemological processes of its production.” Cleveland 
(2001, page 263) 
 
An understanding of the joint contribution of objectivist and constructivist approaches is 
intuitively attractive here, as it combines the evidence, for example, on plant 
development, gene function and the like, built on years of observation and 
experimentation, with the influence of social context and both market and non-market 
values (Badger and Proost,1997). Cleveland (2001) characterises this as a third 
epistemology: holism. This more pluralistic view is supported by Tsouvalis et al (2000) 
who explore ‘knowledge cultures’ that embrace the fluidity of diverse forms of knowledge 
and information, personally, socially and scientifically constructed. In empirical research 
of precision farming in England, they are able to observe a ‘mingling’ of objectivist and 
14 
 
constructivist information in farmer decision-making. This is consistent with Ingram’s 
(2008) findings in relation to soil management in England, were farmers were found to 
use a combination of both ‘scientific’ and ‘tacit’ knowledge. Van Gorp and Van der Goop 
(2012) add to this ‘mingling’ characterisation, by asserting that constructivist notions 
mooted in a sustainable agriculture context can be as mythical as objectivist notions are 
limited: not all that comes from nature is axiomatically good.  
 
But Sparkes and Smith (2009) argue that this ‘mingling’ position is untenable. Either 
there is an objective scientific reality that exists outside of ourselves, or there is not. The 
world is either absolute, or it is relative (Smith and Hodkinson, 2005).  
 
Cleveland (2001) also cites Simmonds (1990, page 337) (whom he characterises as “an 
eminent plant breeder”) in respect of addressing (what has been characterised above as) 
the non-market characteristics of knowledge for sustainable agriculture: 
 
“serious questions about the socioeconomic role and effects of plant breeding are rarely 
asked, and good answers are hard to give”  
 
Cleveland (2001) concludes that the usefulness of objectivist knowledge in its 
consumption also will be critical in the development of the objectives of sustainable 
agriculture: the ‘science’ of increasing food outputs per hectare is of limited value if the 
agricultural system in question is not seeking to achieve this in the first place.  
 
As well as social and economic context, Morgan and Murdoch (2000) emphasise the 
importance of relearning local knowledge for sustainable agriculture. Such agriculture 
requires a departure from path dependent knowledge – a stepping aside from the 
codified knowledge of intensive agriculture. A reassertion of local knowledge, they claim, 
will help to secure coexistence of food production with natural systems, minimising 
pollution and environmental damage as well as reducing the use of non-renewable 
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resources. The building of natural soil fertility and the ethical treatment of animals also 
are likely to ensue with a reassertion of local or ‘indigenous’ understandings. In contrast 
to objectivist constructions in research, which focus on the discovery of new knowledge, 
a localist element to constructivist knowledge might suggest research on rediscovering 
‘old’ knowledge: the way that things were done before they were forgotten.  
 
Thus, in a Foucaultian (1978) sense, local knowledge leads to a reassertion of control 
locally, enabling individuals more effective self-governance. But at the same time, it can 
lead to a scepticism and mistrust on the part of outside ‘professionals’ (Zanetti, 1998, 
Yang, 2006).  
 
Morgan and Murdoch (2000) conflate this local knowledge with tacit knowledge, 
suggesting that knowledge that is conveyed through personal interaction in a context of 
shared experiences is: 
 
“local, context-specific, tacit knowledge” (page 161) 
 
A departure from this position is argued here, drawing a distinction between local 
knowledge which is context dependent but known and articulated, and tacit knowledge, 
which essentially remains unstated. This distinction is critical in being able to 
differentiate tacit knowledge in the way set out below.  
 
5. Tacit knowledge 
 
Polanyi (1946) claims that objectivist knowledge has an ‘explicit’ part (the findings) but 
also a ‘non-explicit’ part which is our underlying belief systems. Often we are not 
consciously aware of this non-explicit part of objectivist knowledge. Polanyi (1958) 
termed this ‘tacit’ knowledge and one of the characteristics of tacit knowledge, he 
asserts, is that it prevents knowledge from being reduced to a set of rules.  
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In a related vein, Merton (1973) suggests that scientific knowledge comprises three 
components: the methods that verify facts, the facts themselves and then a set of 
complex values and norms that are held to be binding (reinforceable by sanction) in the 
science in question. Again, Merton terms these values and norms, ‘tacit’ knowledge. 
 
As with sustainable agriculture, there is no agreed definition of tacit knowledge. Lejeune 
(2011) asserts that we must guard against its use in a superficial or ‘catchall’ sense 
simply to mean informal or unstated knowledge. In particular, he suggests, this fails to 
distinguish between that knowledge which has yet to be formalised (which is not tacit 
knowledge) and that which cannot be formalised (which is). 
 
Thus, in placing a finer grain on the interpretation of tacit knowledge, Polanyi (1966) 
posits that tacit knowing is the process by which people integrate subsidiary awareness 
into what he terms ‘focal awareness’. He feels that it has four elements: 
phenomenological, (as knowledge appears to us from our experiences), instrumental 
(the extent to which the knowledge is useful to us or serves a purpose), semantic (what 
linguistic meaning we accord knowledge) and ontological (how knowledge fits in with our 
own existence or reality). Tacit knowledge, Polanyi feels, is that which derives from 
experience and intuition and through shared experiences (Allen-Collinson, 2004). As 
such, it is often difficult to translate into rational language because it derives from a 
context, or a set of cultural rules, often implicit (Ingram, 2008), within which knowledge 
assimilation takes place. This makes it, asserts Lejeune (2011), intuitive.  
 
These cultural rules are rarely laid down or taught, but are rather assimilated through 
interaction. They are nevertheless essential to ‘know’ to be able to function properly in a 
particular context. They are not susceptible to codification or representation through 
conventional means such as ‘rational’ language (Allen-Collinson, 2003). It is assimilated, 
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rather, through observation, intimation, socialisation and mechanisms such as mentoring 
(von Krogh et al, 2000).  
 
Gerholm (1990) provides a useful framework for adapting Polanyi’s (1966) four elements 
of tacit knowledge into an empirically testable frame. He discusses the nature of tacit 
knowledge from his perspective as an academic anthropologist. His discussion has been 
adapted here in an attempt to identify the different kinds of tacit knowledge that can be 
explored within a LINSA. This is done as a heuristic device in order to allow empirical 
testing of tacit knowledge (Garfinkel, 1967). 
 
At least six discrete (but overlapping) types can be distinguished. The first will be called 
customs. It will be important to be aware of the customs and routines that operate 
within a LINSA and to understand the way it operates and what is expected of people 
working within it. Bourdieu (1975) has suggested that this kind of tacit knowledge is 
often understood differently in different contexts, citing the norm of co-operation and 
teamwork in scientific discovery but also providing examples of how this can be broken 
to good effect through the stimulus of competition (not co-operating), a ‘counter-norm’. 
Reix (1995) terms this form of tacit knowledge, implicit knowledge. 
 
The second, to use Gerholm’s (1990) term, is savoir faire. Being aware of customs is not 
the same as knowing how to handle them (and therefore replicate them), particularly 
when they appear to be in conflict. Savoir faire is the ability to work effectively within 
the LINSA. It is similar to that form of tacit knowledge that Albino et al (2001) term ‘the 
knack’, Giunipero et al, (1999) ‘intuition’ and Bourdieu (1975), ‘a feel for the game’. The 
third kind of tacit knowledge is folklore. This is what gives the LINSA its mentality. It 
would include knowing who is whom, what their position is in the organisation (prime 
mover, pessimist) and where the LINSA is actually going, almost despite any stated 
objectives. It embraces the LINSAs’s underlying values. This has parallels with what 
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Valente and Luzi (2000) term ‘context’ and what Howells (2002) observes as varying by 
geographical location. 
 
A fourth kind of tacit knowledge is termed identity. This is the essence of the LINSA 
itself: how it sees itself and how it perceives its position, almost as a feeling, in wider 
society. How does the LINSA relate to the values of conventional agriculture, for 
example? How self conscious is it in a context where people are not committed to 
sustainable principles? This kind of tacit knowledge, is influenced by how well developed 
the LINSA is. A fifth tacit knowledge is termed roles. It is concerned with knowing how 
individual people, actions and policies fit in with each other and the ultimate ‘direction of 
travel’ of the LINSA. This knowledge requires continual adjustment as the roles of other 
aspects of the LINSA continually change.  
 
Finally, there is discourse. This relates to the kind of tacit knowledge associated with the 
understanding of different scientific discourses, which have many different genres and 
styles. Does the LINSA present itself differently at official conferences relative to internal 
discussion groups, for example? Is the LINSA represented differently ‘over coffee’ 
(Goffman’s (1959) back stage) than it is at the AGM (the front stage), even though the 
same people might be present at each? Here, situations have to be read correctly and 
discourses adjusted as a result.  
 
6. Exploring the nature of tacit knowledge empirically 
 
This taxonomy was explored within the BHFP through the mix of methods reported in 
section 1. Customs were explored through understandings of the LINSA operating within 
its wider spatial, organisational and ‘values’ context. Dominant here is a sense that ‘new’ 
customs and distinct routines had been created that broke the mould of earlier thinking 
about food in the City of Brighton and Hove. Food production and consumption were only 
one aspect of a wider push for the adoption of sustainable principles in the city. It was 
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widely understood that there was an expectation of food being subservient to a larger 
sustainability project. A member of the BHFP board noted: 
 
“Our system is looking at the whole system, so ….. our role concerns a more holistic 
approach to sustainable living: community development, healthy lifestyles, mental 
health – it is about all of these things. It’s about jobs, it’s about livelihoods, it’s about 
the economy, it’s about delivering the 360 degree sustainability picture. Whilst the 
strategy is a food strategy, the benefits that we wanted to communicate in the strategy 
are about what overall difference it is going to make. Agriculture and food production are 
part of this but we are not taking this as a starting point.” 
 
Other participant-stakeholders appeared accordant with this expectation. Whilst not all 
were able to embrace every aspect of what they perceived to be sustainable principles, 
all aspired to the pursuit of multiple objectives. A member of a social enterprise offered 
the following: 
 
“The importance of food for us is to offer a better mental health stability, like controlling 
sugar levels. This has led to honey production up at the farm and people buy this in the 
truckloads in the cafe. Getting people up early to knead bread for the bakery is good 
therapy. At the farm, the expectation is to grow more food, but the purpose is 
therapeutic stuff, there is a sensory garden, but some see that as a space for growing 
more food. ....... What we do here (in the cafe) is to teach people how to cook food, how 
to prepare food and how to manage waste. We work with black and ethnic minority 
people and help them look at, sort of, look at, you know, British cuisine and how the 
transition of ingredients they are used to using can come into it”. 
 
And those with a particular interest in environmental issues still saw the value of using 
food production to achieve a number of purposes simultaneously: 
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“With our particular (environmental) background we are looking at more perennial soft 
fruits and, you know, perennial vegetables and things like that, integrated into 
ornamental plantings. There is obviously a certain amount of resistance to putting raised 
vegetable beds throughout the (municipal) parks and public spaces, but if the City is 
going to plant a tree for amenity reasons, why not make it a fruit tree? Why not make 
flowers flowering vegetables?” 
 
Without any prompting or orchestration, there was a pervasive and common 
understanding of the custom of seeing food in its wider context.  
 
In the research, various aspects of savoire faire also were considered. From a range of 
different contacts with participant-stakeholders, it was clear that the ‘feel for the game’ 
was variable. Some acknowledged that they had a partial perspective on the LINSA as 
they had a particular interest in only certain aspects of its work. Here, though, there was 
felt to be a “comfortable intuitive territory” in areas of specialism.  
 
Others felt that they had a good grasp of what was going on generally, but weren’t sure 
about how much they didn’t know. This grasp was felt by yet others to be impossible to 
achieve in any comprehensive way as the LINSA was constantly changing (in a good 
way) to accommodate new views and values. One participant-stakeholder who worked 
for a state body suggested that the values and assumptions embedded within the LINSA 
were sufficiently important as to require an intuitive response: 
 
“as we develop our thinking (as a state body) and given that we have signed up to the 
precepts of the Food Strategy, we have to develop a feel for how our pans will be 
consistent with theirs. This requires new layers of our thinking that can fit into the 
Partnership.” 
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A state elected member also suggested that, given the holistic context of the LINSA and 
its relationship with the City, the movement was simply too large to be driven by 
anything other than a feel for what is going on:  
 
“This intuitive grasp is strong and critical. There are so many things going on in 
developing a sustainable Brighton and Hove that there has to be an intuition that sits 
underneath it. A purely ‘rational’ basis for development would make the whole process 
just too big for progress to be made. There has to be a degree of ‘gut instinct’ in 
developments to keep the momentum up. There is probably not enough expertise 
available in any one person to do anything other than work intuitively a lot of the time. 
Intuition has to be underpinned with a clear idea of one’s belief systems, though.” 
 
An intuitive understanding also was seen as important in the operation of a network that 
does not have a regulatory frame. Because the ‘rules of the game’ often are not written 
down, they have to be assimilated in different ways. In this context savoire faire plays 
out through trust relations rather than rules. Whilst trust relations were felt to be the 
norm in voluntary networks, one of the major successes of this LINSA was felt to be the 
way in which state bodies (local municipalities, national parks and health authorities) 
had embraced a trust-based modus operandi.  
 
Amongst the majority of participant-stakeholders, there was a folklore surrounding the 
unique nature of place: a sense that the LINSA happened in the way that it has, only 
because of the context of Brighton itself. A social enterprise manager expressed it as 
follows:  
 
“Brighton was historically quite a transient town where people came to visit and actually 
…. a lot of people just didn’t go, they just stayed. And as such they’ve grown up with 
kids and suddenly they’ve got this responsibility to make the City suitable for what their 
needs are. And I think what has arisen out of that is an incredible amount of partnership 
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working, openness, people throwing ideas into the pot and everyone else going …. ‘yea, 
let’s have a look at that, let’s have a look at this’. We’ve been to conferences in Leeds 
and Manchester and places where they are just really struggling to get people to help 
with ideas. Brighton is a really nice place to do that, um, and I think that’s where the 
Food Partnership fits in very nicely. ………. There is a certain ‘hippyishness’ of the, sort of, 
the people who’ve settled here, that have kind of formed this together, but actually now 
they’re now looking at it very cleverly, very responsibly. ……. It’s the nature of Brighton 
is why it’s worked.” 
 
With the only national Green MP in England and a Green City administration, sustainable 
issues are uniquely high on the agenda. As an employee of the local state put it: 
 
“You will find things in Brighton like a massage therapist working out of a wholefood 
restaurant, that you won’t find in other places”. 
 
In terms of folklore, too, there appeared a strong understanding of who people were 
amongst those who considered themselves members of the BHFP, despite no formal 
organisational structure to the BHFP outside of its Board. At group meetings, for example 
the launch of the second BHFP Food Strategy, Digging Deeper, there was a clear rapport 
and common sense of purpose amongst those present. There were no boundaries 
defining who may and may not be present at this launch but upwards of seventy people 
from local state bodies, voluntary organisations and commercial concerns were present. 
Most seemed to know each other well, many were on first name terms. 
 
There was an acknowledgement that different groups could sign up to the Partnership 
even though their overall values might differ from those of the Food Strategy: in this 
sense there was enough in common for a working relationship to succeed. 
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In terms of the tacit nature of the identity of the LINSA, two elements constantly 
surfaced: how the LINSA was perceived in relation to the City, and how it saw itself in 
relation to conventional agriculture. Participant-stakeholders felt that there was 
unusually high buy-in from the local population. There is very high interest in growing 
local food, foraging is systematic and despite the increasing provision of allotments, 
waiting lists are growing. For many people, this reinforces identity with their locality. 
 
Participant-stakeholders did note, however, that the sustainable food message did not 
necessarily touch everyone in the City. Here the importance of viewing the LINSA as a 
social movement rather than a food movement was considered important. This has led 
to the development of training and learning and some targeting of the less well off, at 
least by housing type. As a state employee noted:  
 
“part of the value (of BHFP) as a community movement is er, is that it can have a social 
impact  ....... it can encourage specific social groups to become involved in local food 
production and consumption. There are specific projects in Brighton’s most deprived 
wards, you know, that encourage food production, and projects for the unemployed, 
young people, ethnic minorities and people like that. The outdoors and being close to 
nature can be important to these groups in particular”. 
 
Because the LINSA is concerned with food consumption and its role in health as much as 
production, the link with agriculture can be seen as tenuous. The disparity in the amount 
of public funds to conventional agriculture (through the CAP) compared with community 
agriculture was another stark distinction made by more than one participant-
stakeholder. Making connections with mainstream agriculture is a priority in the Food 
Strategy, but not that straightforward. The City, for example, owns farms but can do 
little to transform the way they operate. A member of a voluntary body noted:  
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“Yes, there s little connection with commercial agriculture, yes, .... there is more 
crossover with small scale organic agriculture but even then ..... it remains to be seen. 
Most of the farmland around the City is owned by the City Council but most of it is tied 
up under longer, longer term tenure – three generations. Nothing innovative has 
happened there. It is not too late for it to happen but the Council’s priorities for that land 
(in sustainability terms) are nature conservation and recreation and food production is 
pretty low.” 
 
Some strengthening connections with local agriculture were noted, however, particularly 
in respect of short food chains (farmers’ markets, farm shops, local shop supply and so 
on).  
 
In terms of the tacit understanding of the roles of people involved in the Partnership, 
participant-stakeholders who were employed by the local state had a confidence in 
knowing what their own roles were even though these roles were seen as partial and had 
never actually been articulated by anyone. This confidence came as a result of some 
perceived commonality of purpose between the local state and the LINSA, and in the 
case of the City Council, the Food Strategy had been adopted as policy: purposes 
became synonymous. The importance of adopting the Strategy and reinforcing the 
mutuality of roles in this area was noted by a City Council member participant-
stakeholder:  
 
“It is important from our perspective that it (the Food Strategy) succeeds because there 
are increasing numbers of people suffering from food poverty and we need to make food 
a higher priority. We are beginning to tackle obesity – it is very prevalent and there is 
much to do there.” 
 
Aside from state stakeholders, a social entrepreneur noted the inevitable tensions for 
most members of the partnership in having roles that were both inside the Partnership’s 
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objectives but also outside of it. These roles could be sympathetic, antithetic or 
irrelevant to the Food Strategy. A voluntary sector participant was clear and enthusiastic 
about his role, however, because he had been given a choice about what it could be. 
Recognising the broad holistic precepts of the role of the Partnership, he was pleased to 
be able to concentrate on that small part of it that he felt he could do best.  
 
There was less clarity over the roles of others within the LINSA. One participant-
stakeholder claimed that she was not really concerned about the roles of others and 
another that her knowledge was partial: the roles of state bodies were clear, others less 
so. A Board member suggested that it was not to be expected that everyone would know 
everyone’s roles. The partnership was informal and roles were changing constantly over 
time. Most member organisations had different roles inside and outside the partnership 
and these are not always easy to differentiate, with members moving both within and 
outside the Strategy Framework. This was good, the Board member felt, lest the 
Partnership became too formal or ‘closed’: 
 
“there are over 100 initiatives going on in Brighton and Hove around food in one way or 
another. Now, the Partnership can act as a hub for all of those and facilitate 
communication between all of those but, you know, they’re autonomous projects at the 
same time. The Partnership does not tell them what to do but they are part of the larger 
movement and they can help share knowledge” 
 
Whatever any one person understood of the roles of ‘others’ in the Partnership, they did 
seem to know what they were doing and how they fitted in with each other. The success 
of the first Strategy in achieving 90% of its targets in the first five years is testimony, 
the state elected member felt, to that. The Food Partnership has been a success as a 
partnership in bringing lots of small groups together but the key players have been vital 
in achieving things because of their persistence and enthusiasm.  
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In terms of discourses, both Food Strategies had been deliberately written in an 
accessible language and were concerned with objectives, principles and values as well as 
action. In contrast, regular newsletters supporting the strategy were more practical and 
anecdotal in respect of action on the ground: each type of document covered different 
characteristics of the strategy. This extended to verbal discourse. A voluntary sector 
member sought to explain the strategy differently, to different people: 
 
“That’s my tendency, to work in that way anyway, but erm …… yea, a lot of people are 
turned off by policy and it only becomes real in terms of what it enables to be achieved 
on the ground. Um, and that is definitely a way of communicating to say a box scheme 
operator or someone like that”.  
 
In this context, a Board Member suggested that it was not so much the language that 
had to change according with whom one was speaking, but the subject of the 
conversation: 
 
“If you wanted to talk to a local interest group, be that local farmers, you’d want, it 
wouldn’t be the language so much but it would be the focus of the conversation, you 
know, what is it, where are the synergies between what you’re doing and what we’re 
doing. …… your focus would be very much on understanding their needs and their 
challenges and how the Food Partnership could assist in that. So it’s not so much the 
language, I suppose, but it’s about understanding what their priorities are” 
 
Whilst two employees of the local state who were involved with the Partnership felt that 
the language of the Strategy was so universal that it did not need to be explained in 
different ways to different people, a state elected member felt that it provided an 
excellent platform for debate. In this context, the discourse was steered by the citizenry 
as much as the originators of the Strategy: 
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“I mean, you communicate with different people in different ways. Errr ….. no one’s  
going to say no to having healthier food or more local food, having food as a much more 
interesting aspect of your life. And you can have so many good conversations with 
people around that, at all different levels. People in the City are very up for this” 
 
7. Conclusion: how important is tacit knowledge for sustainable agriculture? 
 
Researching tacit knowledge can be difficult because of its implicit and unstated nature. 
Nevertheless, the adaptation of Gerholm’s (1990) taxonomy does allow an exploration of 
some of its different facets. As a subset located within constructivist epistemologies, tacit 
knowledge described in this way can be observed to be a significant presence in the 
development of the LINSA in this case study. Indeed, in the context of the participatory 
methods used in this research, the enthusiasms and commitments observed and 
evidenced within the LINSA appeared not so much based in the ‘science’ of food 
production but in the ‘community’ of food production. If sustainable agriculture is to 
embrace the social, cultural and environmental fully, tacit knowledge is likely to have a 
clear role to play in shaping courses of action.  
 
In this context, tacit knowledge invariably is acquired indirectly or incidentally. It can be 
assimilated where lessons are learnt about one thing whilst seeking knowledge about 
another. Where people assimilate knowledge through mutual learning, it is possible that 
explicit and tacit knowledge can be closely aligned. Such mutual learning is often a 
fertile context in which new customs, cultures and value systems grow and can provide 
the opportunity to see ‘scientific’ knowledge in context, rather than externally imposed. 
But it is not always the case that users of such knowledge interpret these distinctions 
between objectivist and constructivist knowledges consistently. Kings and Ilbery (2010), 
for example, found that there is no necessary relationship between those who believe 
that they are farming in sustainable ways and their adherence to constructivist 
knowledge. In their case studies, both ‘organic’ and ‘conventional’ farmers used a mix of 
28 
 
both objectivist and constructivist knowledges but there was no tendency for either type 
of farmer to use one type of knowledge over another. 
 
Certainly, tacit knowledge cannot be overtly learned. It has to be experienced and 
assimilated rather than simply passed on. It invariably involves ‘beliefs’ as well as ‘facts’, 
which can marginalise it within the objectivist epistemology. Exchanging specific tacit 
knowledge is thus a limited activity because there are small numbers of people to whom 
it can meaningfully be passed on and the means of exchanging it is experiential rather 
than word-based and requires a mutuality of values between giver and receiver. Such 
exchange is also something that the conventional (codified) AKIS is not geared up to do.  
 
Morgan and Murdoch (2000) suggest that knowledge is one of the key elements that 
binds partnerships such as LINSAs together. In this role it can be prescriptive or 
negotiative. Prescriptive knowledge here tends to be of the objectivist type – as codified 
knowledge it brings rules and norms that lead to conformity. Negotiative knowledge 
tends to be more about local autonomy. This notion of negotiative knowledge can be 
extended beyond local knowledge to the notion of tacit knowledge used in this paper. 
This extension beyond local knowledge stresses the important distinction between local 
and tacit knowledge that has been emphasised here, as a departure from the original 
Morgan and Murdoch (2000) construction. Different types of knowledge are likely to be 
distributed and redistributed in various different ways. Murdoch (1998) suggests that the 
prescriptive knowledge has a ‘coercive’ element to it and negotiative, a ‘co-operative’ (or 
even consensual) element and therefore different types of knowledge describe different 
kinds of power relations within partnerships. Within this mix, the operation of tacit 
knowledge requires more trust than objectivist or codified knowledge but is pervasive 
and often remains under-considered because of its implicit nature.  
 
For the development of sustainable agriculture in general, then, it is likely that 
constructivist forms of knowledge will become embraced more fully into AKSs, and 
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objectivist knowledge adapted to more holistic farming systems. The ‘complex’ set of 
objectives, values and styles of implementation in sustainable agriculture do not lend 
themselves well to reductionist or universalist knowledge. It will need to be 
acknowledged that the application of knowledge for sustainable agriculture will be 
context dependent and that context will be scientifically, culturally, purposefully – and 
tacitly - different in each locality. 
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